

Consultation Questionnaire on the Draft Framework Guideline on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

General introduction

The purpose of the non-binding Framework Guideline (FG) is to set high-level principles that should be further elaborated in the Network Code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows.

The role of the FG and of the following network code, is to supplement and further specialise existing cybersecurity and risk preparedness directives and regulations, introducing viable solutions to identified cybersecurity gaps and risks.

The objective of the network code, based on the draft FG principle, should be to solve, mitigate and prevent the potential high impact or materialization of cybersecurity risks, as well as to prevent those cybersecurity attacks or incidents that may impact real time operations (causing cascade effects).

ACER invites all concerned stakeholders to contribute to the public consultation, and therefore to define and shape the final Framework Guideline.

Next steps:

- ACER will analyse the responses received in July 2021 and will deliver a final version of the FG to the European Commission.
- In July 2021, ACER will publish a summary of the consultation, including an evaluation of the responses.
- ACER will publish all responses received and the identity of their respective stakeholders (unless stated otherwise). For this reason, please indicate if your response may be publicly disclosed or not, and if you agree with the data protection policy.

All concerned stakeholders are invited to respond to the public consultation on the proposed Framework Guideline.

The public consultation will run between 30 April 2021 to 29 June 2021 at 23:59 Ljubljana Time.

ACER will only accept responses in electronic format, no other format will be accepted. **In case of technical problems with the submission of your responses please contact DFG-NC-CS@acer.europa.eu.**

ACER will organise a workshop to introduce and explain the content of the proposed Framework Guideline, in May 2021. More information will be circulated via ACER Infoflash closer to the date of the event.

* First Name

* Last Name

* Company/Institution

* Type of business

Address

* Contact email

Phone

Country

I confirm that I have read the [data protection notice in this link and accepted.](#)

- Yes
- No

I authorise the disclosure of my identity together with my response

- Yes
- No (I want my response being completely anonymous)

1. Meeting the general objectives

Question 1 - Does the Framework Guideline contribute to the following objectives?

	Yes	No
To further protect cross-border electricity flows, in particular critical processes, assets and operations from current and future cyber threats?	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

To promote a culture that aims to continuously improve the cybersecurity maturity and not to simply comply with the minimum level	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To mitigate the impact of cyber incidents or attacks or to promote preparedness and resilience in case of cyber incidents or attacks?	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To support the functioning of the European society and economy in a crisis situation caused by a cyber-incident or attack, with the potential of cascading effects?	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
To create and promote trust, transparency and coordination in the supply chain of systems and services used in the critical operations, processes and functions of the electricity sector?	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

Please, provide a short explanation justifying your assessment, if needed:

600 character(s) maximum

The FG contribute to major objectives. However, the proposed scope fails to cover main cross-border cybersecurity risks, including electro-intensive consumers, charging point operators, entities with an installed capacity of more than 1MW, and any company interconnected with electricity undertakings. They should be integrated "by design" in the NC.

Enedis welcomes the integration of the supply chain of essential electricity undertakings as part of the NC. But the requirements should be further clarified in the FG and all the responsibilities cannot solely lie with electricity undertakings.

Question 2 - Do you see any gaps concerning the cybersecurity of cross-border electricity flows which the draft FG proposal should address?

- Yes
- No

If yes, provide details

600 character(s) maximum

The keystone of the NC is the notion of "cross-border electricity flow". However, the FG does not provide its definition. Regulation 2019/943 provides a definition requiring further clarification and illustration in the context of the NC. It is unclear whether the NC will apply to all entities in table 1, or only to those that can impact or be impacted by cross-border flows, and how this will be assessed. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the gaps and answer question 2.

2. Scope, applicability and exemptions.

Question 3 - The draft FG suggests that the Network Code shall apply to public and private electricity undertakings including suppliers, DSOs, TSOs, producers, nominated electricity market operators, electricity market participants (aggregators, demand response and energy storage services), ENTSO-E, EU-DSO, ACER, Regional Coordination Centres and essential service suppliers (as defined in the FG). Does the FG applicability cover all entities that may have an impact on cross-border electricity flows, as a consequence of a cybersecurity incident/attack?

- Yes

No

Please, explain who is missing and why

600 character(s) maximum

More entities – whatever their size - must be covered by the FG. Because the energy system is more interconnected and digitalised, hackers can target the most vulnerable parts of the network (with poor cybersecurity requirements) and spread throughout the value chain. The FG should retain the possibility of including electro-intensive consumers, charging point operators or small production units in the NC in order to prevent cascading effects of a cybersecurity incident.

Also, the FG must take a systemic approach and keep in mind the risk of simultaneous attacks on small yet bundled assets.

3. Classifications of applicable entities and transitional measures

Question 4 - The proposed FG prescribes a process to differentiate electricity undertakings based on their level of criticality/risk, and setting different obligations depending on their criticality/risk level. This will imply a transition period until the full system is established and will require the establishment of a proper governance to duly manage the entire risk assessment process. Do you think that the proposed transition is the most appropriate?

Yes
 No

Would you suggest another transition approach and why?

600 character(s) maximum

The FG provides for the establishment of a transitional list categorizing important and essential Electricity Undertakings. The companies will later be categorized by the ECRI method. Following the FG concept, some companies may be considered “temporarily” as essential and then be reclassified as important. Such uncertainty will not allow industrials to invest easily. The FG must give assurances that the transitional list of essential companies is proposed “a minima” and that those already targeted have every chance of being confirmed by the ECRI method.

Question 5 – The FG proposes that all small and micro-businesses, with the exception of those that, despite their size, are defined as important/essential electricity undertakings, shall be exempted from the obligations set in the NC (excluding the general requirements for cyber hygiene). Do you think this approach is consistent with the general idea to uplift and harmonise the cybersecurity level within the ecosystem in order to efficiently protect cross-border electricity flows?

Yes
 No

Please, explain why:

600 character(s) maximum

Enedis agrees with a proportionate approach and differentiated requirements between SME/important /essential entities make sense.

However, as mentioned in Q3, the FG will remain inadequate if it excludes entities – whatever their size – that represent a risk to the whole network.

Enedis would like to propose two options for the scope of the FG. Option 1 would include any actor that is digitally connected to an electricity undertaking (in particular to DSOs) in the SME category of the NC.

Option 2 would be to develop more requirements for these actors, in the NC and/or in the NIS directive.

4. Cybersecurity security governance

Question 6 - Do you find that the proposed FG succeeds in establishing a sound governance for the overall process of ensuring the cybersecurity of cross-border electricity flows?

- Yes
- No

Question 7 – The proposed FG describes the process and governance to determine the conditions to classify and distinguish electricity undertakings with different risk profiles for cross-border electricity flows. Is the decision on setting up the conditions assigned to the right decision group or should that decision be taken at a higher strategic level in respect to what is proposed in the draft, having in mind that this decision will be extremely sensitive?

- Yes, the decision is taken by the right decision group.
- No, the decision shall be taken at a higher strategic level.

Please, explain shortly by whom and your reasoning:

600 character(s) maximum

The process and governance in the Network Code should rely on what already exists under the NIS directive. However, some aspects are still confusing. For instance, The FG allow electricity companies to identify SMEs that qualify as important or essential entities. The proposed NIS2 gives the competence to national authorities.

Question 8 – Please, tell us which aspects of the proposed governance may better be developed further.

Per each line covering the governance aspects of each chapter, please select all statements that can fit.

	Roles are defined	Responsibilities are assigned	Authorities are defined	Accountability is clear	High level decisional processes are defined
General Governance	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cross Border Risk Management	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Common Electricity Cybersecurity Level	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Essential information flows, Incident and Crisis Management	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Other aspects	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, add comments in case you may suggest changes to the attribution of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and to the envisaged processes, where described.

600 character(s) maximum

5. Cross border risk management

Question 9 – The draft FG proposes a high-level methodology for cross border risk assessment presented in chapter 3 and based on three consecutive levels. Is this high-level methodology adequate for assessing and managing risks of cross-border electricity flows?

- Yes
- No

Question 10 - Do you think that the FG covers the risks that may derive by the supply chain?

- It covers too much.
- It covers fairly.
- It covers fairly, but the tools and means shall be clearer.
- It covers poorly.

5. Common Electricity Cybersecurity Level

Question 11 - Considering the ‘minimum cybersecurity requirements’ (with regard to Table 2 of the FG), select just one option:

- They are applied to the right entities, they are proportional, and they fit with the purpose to protect cross-border electricity flows from cybersecurity threats.
- They are applied to the right entities, they are proportional, but they do not fully fit with the purpose to protect cross-border electricity flows from cybersecurity threats.
- They are applied to the right entities, but they are not proportional, and they partially fit with the purpose to protect cross-border electricity flows from cybersecurity threats.
- They are applied to the wrong categories.

Question 12 - Considering the ‘advanced cybersecurity requirements’ (with regard to Table 2 of the FG), select just one option:

- They are applied to the right entities, they are proportional, and the fit with the purpose to protect cross-border electricity flows from cybersecurity threats.
- They are applied to the right entities, they are proportional, but they do not fully fit with the purpose to protect cross-border electricity flows from cybersecurity threats.
- They are applied to the right entities, but they are not proportional, and they partially fit with the purpose to protect cross-border electricity flows from cybersecurity threats.
- They are applied to the wrong category and entities.

Please, explain your reasoning for your answer to question 11 and 12, if necessary

600 character(s) maximum

As mentioned above, the proposed scope of application of the Network Code fails to cover all the entities that can represent a cyber-risk. In addition, as long as we don't know which electricity undertakings will be categorized as important or essential, it is difficult to answer to these questions. As the FG is unclear on this point, there is a high risk that the different levels of obligations apply to the wrong category and entities.

Question 13 - Please select the option(s) which in your view better represent how a common cybersecurity framework protecting cross-border electricity flows, should be established and enforced?

- Through common electricity cybersecurity level that shall be certifiable by a third party (e.g. by the application of ISO/IEC 27001 certification).
- The framework shall be based on a set of agreed requirements that shall be assessed, and their implementation shall be subject to governmental inspections.
- A peer accreditation process shall be established, where electricity undertakings evaluate each other against a set of agreed requirements set by governmental authorities.
- A combination of those above.
- Another better solution.

Please, briefly describe it:

600 character(s) maximum

Question 14 - The proposed FG extends the obligation of the cybersecurity measures and standards to "essential service suppliers" to which an entity may outsource essential services, operations of essential assets and services, or a full essential process, that has an impact on the cybersecurity of cross-border electricity flows. Do you think this approach is correct?

- Yes
- No

Please, explain why:

600 character(s) maximum

Enedis welcomes the considerations about the supply chain but calls for clarified requirements and a balanced share of responsibilities between actors.

There are two types of service suppliers. For ad hoc services (tailor made for one electricity undertaking), Enedis agrees with the guidelines proposed by the NC. But when purchasing services, such as Solar WindsActive Directory, electricity undertakings do not create a specific relationship with the suppliers and cannot complete the NC requirements alone. European authorities and ENISA should be involved in the reporting requirements.

6. Essential information flows, Incident and Crisis Management

Question 15 - The FG proposes the use of designated Electricity Undertaking Security Operation Centre (SOC) capabilities to enable information sharing and to smooth incident response flows from all electricity undertakings in order to:

- Provide agility to all electricity undertakings with respect to sharing and handling important cybersecurity information for cross-border cybersecurity electricity flows;
- Avoid interference and additional workload on the National CSIRTs and to their existing cooperation;
- Promote a responsible, autonomous, flexible, timely, coordinated and controlled approach to information sharing and incident handling, in line with current electricity practices and in line with the specific operational needs.

Considering the proposed approach, please select one option:

- The proposed approach is feasible, can foster trust and provide enough flexibility and reliability, which are essential for the cross-border electricity flows.
- The proposed approach is feasible and can foster trust but it is not ideal for meeting the requested flexibility and reliability level.
- The proposed approach is feasible, but can hardly foster trust and it is not ideal for meeting the requested flexibility and reliability level.
- The proposed approach is not feasible, therefore needs to be reviewed.

Please, explain the reasoning for your choice (and if not feasible, explain the alternatives you would envisage)

600 character(s) maximum

Mandatory information sharing solutions show less attractive performance than those shared in networks of voluntary trust. They lead to “minimum” participations. Moreover, it is surprising that companies under attack only have 2 hours to issue their alert where more experienced national CSIRTs have 18 hours to transmit the information. Public entities should pave the way to Electricity Undertakings and not the opposite. Regardless, the obligation for national CSIRTs to transmit information within limited timeframes is welcomed and fully responds to remarks made during previous consultations.

Question 16 – The draft FG proposes the adoption of SOC to overcome other needs that go beyond the simple information sharing:

while it will offer the possibility to let the electricity sector to autonomously structure the information sharing infrastructure, ideally sharing resources and cooperating with the aim to reduce costs, offering high-end cybersecurity protection to cross border electricity flows, the same SOC may be delegated to other certain tasks for which a SOC is better placed in order to offer services (e.g. orchestrating cooperation with other CSIRTs, providing support in planning and execution of cybersecurity exercises, support and cooperate with critical and important electricity undertakings during crisis management situations and more);

Do you think that this secondary role is appropriate for the SOC?

- Yes
- No

Please, provide your reasoning:

600 character(s) maximum

The activity of SOCs should be devoted exclusively to defense and protection without having to deal with regulatory tasks (organization of crisis exercises or other). SOCs should not be assigned tasks that are to be performed by CSIRTs. In addition, regulations should not interfere with internal business organizations.

Question 17 - Do you believe a Cybersecurity Electricity Early Warning System as described in the proposed FG chapter 5.4 is necessary?

- Yes, it is necessary.
- No, it is not necessary.

Question 18 - Concerning the obligation for essential electricity undertakings to take part to cybersecurity exercise as described in chapter 6 of the draft FG, please select one of the following options:

- It is in line with the objectives, and it contributes to the substantial improvement of the cybersecurity posture necessary for cross-border electricity flows.
- It is in line with the objectives, and it contributes to the substantial improvement of the cybersecurity posture necessary for cross-border electricity flows, but the applicability should be extended to all electricity undertakings.
- It is in line with the objectives, but it does not really contribute to the improvement of the cybersecurity posture necessary for cross-border electricity flows.
- It is not in the objectives, and it should be abandoned.

Please, briefly describe the reasoning behind your choice:

600 character(s) maximum

The proposed frequency of exercises seems ambitious, especially for national and regional exercises. A slower rhythm would be more realistic. Crucially, experience feedback should lead to corrective and preventive actions. The NC shall define the tool to monitor and ensure the success of the exercises.

ACER proposes to remunerate the costs of crisis exercises. Securing budgets is key to successfully implement the NC. The suggestion could eventually be extended to other activities, i.e. SOC activities, inventory assets, or any implementation costs that are deemed relevant.

7. Protection of information exchanged in the context of this data processing

Question 19 - The proposed FG provides for rules to protect all information exchanged in the context of the data processing concerning the network code.

Considering the proposed rules and principles, please select one of the following options:

- The proposed rules and principles are appropriate and cover all aspects needed to secure the information exchanges in the context of the network code.
- The proposed rules and principles are appropriate but miss some additional aspects needed to secure the information exchanges in the context of the network code.
- The proposed rules and principles are not appropriate and miss many additional aspects needed to secure the information exchanges in the context of the network code.
- The proposed rules are excessive, and a relaxation of rules and principles is suggested.

Please, describe the reasoning behind your choice:

600 character(s) maximum

8. Monitoring, benchmarking and reporting under the network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows

Question 20 - The proposed FG suggest monitoring obligations to verify the effectiveness in the implementation of the NC. In this respect, do you think they are appropriate?

- The proposed monitoring obligations are appropriate and they cover all aspects needed to carefully monitor the implementation of the network code.
- The proposed monitoring obligations are appropriate but they do not cover all aspects needed to carefully monitor the implementation of the network code.
- The proposed monitoring obligations are not appropriate and they do not cover all aspects needed to monitor the implementation of the network code.
- The proposed monitoring obligations are excessive, and a major revision of the principles is suggested.

Please, describe the reasoning behind your choice

600 character(s) maximum

Monitoring should be considered as a second step, once harmonization has been achieved.

Question 21 - The proposed FG suggests benchmarking obligations to control the efficiency and prudence in cybersecurity expenditure, resulting from the implementation of the NC. Moreover, benchmarking, together with the identification of cybersecurity maturity levels of electricity undertakings, may constitute the grounds to further incentivise cybersecurity culture for cybersecurity electricity flows in the future.

In this respect, do you think that the benchmarking obligations are appropriate?

- The proposed benchmarking obligations are appropriate and cover all aspects needed to monitor the efficiency and prudence in cybersecurity expenditure during the implementation of the network code.
- The proposed benchmarking obligations are appropriate but they do not cover all aspects needed to monitor the efficiency and prudence in cybersecurity expenditure during the implementation of the network code.
- The proposed benchmarking obligations are not appropriate and they do not cover all aspects needed to monitor the efficiency and prudence in cybersecurity expenditure during the implementation of the network code.
- The proposed benchmarking obligations are excessive, and a major revision of the principles is suggested.

Please, describe the reasoning behind your choice:

600 character(s) maximum

Benchmarking should be considered as a second step, once harmonization has been achieved.

Question 22 - The proposed FG suggests reporting obligations: the aim of the reporting obligations is to facilitate informed high-level decisions on the revision of the network code.

Considering the proposed reporting obligations, please select one of the following options:

- The proposed reporting obligations are appropriate and cover all aspects needed to monitor the achievement of the objectives of the network code.
- The proposed reporting obligations are appropriate but they do not cover all aspects needed to monitor the achievement of the objectives of the network code.
- The proposed reporting obligations are not appropriate and they do not cover all aspects needed to monitor the achievement of the objectives of the network code.
- The proposed reporting obligations are excessive, and a major revision of the principles is suggested.
- The proposed reporting obligations are very limited, and a major revision of the principles is suggested.

Please, describe the reasoning behind your choice:

600 character(s) maximum

The reporting is an interesting concept. However, the FG should propose a more ambitious & dynamic process.

Question 23 - Do you think the proposed FG sufficiently cover cybersecurity aspects of:

	Partially covered	Fairly covered	Substantially Covered	Fully covered
Real-time requirements of energy infrastructure components.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Risk of cascading effects.	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mix of legacy and state-of-the-art technology.	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Question 24 - Do you have any other comment you want to share and that are not included in the previous questions, with regard to the rest of the content of the draft FG ?

1000 character(s) maximum

Some inconsistencies need to be clarified. The concept of cross-border electricity flows must be defined (i.e. with a threshold above which an electricity company generates cross-border flows). Also, the NC should be coordinated with NIS: while the FG allow electricity companies to identify SMEs that qualify as important or essential entities, the proposed NIS2 gives the competence to national authorities.

The scope of the assets inventory must be clarified. Such inventories will imply a huge amount of work for entities. The FG should start with a critical business process identification, through a process-based approach, as initially foreseen by the drafting team.

On certification, we should consider reimbursing the costs in order to incentivise the development of a voluntary scheme.

Lastly, cybersecurity requirements are different depending on national authorities and some entities are already subject to higher obligations. The NC should avoid the multiplication of constraints.

Contact

[Contact Form](#)